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From the crisis of 2008 the concept of banking union emerged in the 
European Union, in the sense that one of the three pillars is the single resolution 
mechanism. The unique resolution mechanism was applied experimentally, in 
Portugal, to Banco Espírito Santo, S.A. (BES) in 3/8/2014. The main objective of 
this dissertation is to investigate the results of the Resolution of BES trying to 
determine how and the reason why the experimental resolution of BES has taken 
place and also how and why the creation of a transition bank, named Novo Banco, 
S.A. (Novo Banco). 
 
In fact, the evaluation of the application of the banking resolution 
mechanism to BES is the most important procedure, since it concerned one of the 
largest national banks inserted in a large financial group – the BES Group – in 
which the impact of an intervention by regulatory and supervisory  authorities, 
would necessarily have the greatest repercussions (financial, judicial, socio- 
political, among others). 
Treating the BES Resolution as a single case, and as a revelatory exploration 
of a contemporary phenomenon, it was deemed appropriate to follow a single case 
study methodology. For the production of scientific evidence, the methods and 
techniques of financial analysis of the individual accounts of BES and Novo Banco 
and the consolidated accounts of the BES Group and the Novo Banco Group were 
used. In the same sense, other elements of qualitative and quantitative analysis were 
also developed, in order to investigate the fundamentals and results of the BES 
resolution.
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The economic and financial analysis of BES and the BES Group, led to a 
conclusion of the unequivocal need for Banco de Portugal intervention after the 
presentation of the accounts of BES on 6/30/2014. The economic and financial 
analysis of Novo Banco and the Novo Banco Group, from 4/8/2014 to 6/30/2016, 
concluded that the Novo Banco’s management pursued the statutory objective of 
preserving the net asset value of the bank as well as the of capital ratios. But this 
was only possible by applying an extraordinary reduction of the size and the assets 
of Novo Banco, 25% (on an individual basis) and 27.8% (on a consolidated basis)  
of its initial value and also making use of an extraordinary balance sheet 
restructuring operations which allowed changes to the original reserve. Moreover, 
the process of recognizing impairments has not been fully contained and continues 
to threaten the Novo Banco’s statutory capital that was held at that time by the Fund 
of Resolution. 
On the other hand, the activity of both the bank and the financial group has 
not been able to achieve acceptable levels of profitability and efficiency in order to 
lead potential buyers to submit proposals that are indisputably advantageous to all 
the agents affected. Thus, the resolution instrument that was applied to BES, while 
complying with the principles of the European resolution mechanism, is limited to a 
national scope, thus having a reduced intervention capacity, since it only 
concentrates the risks in the Portuguese national banking and State institutions. The 
process of resolution may also prove to be indirectly and perversely as a process of 
transferring the ownership rights of capital from domestic banks to foreign hands, 
posing issues of sovereignty. 
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The international financial crisis, which began in 2007, has caused an 
unprecedented banking crisis and the collapse of numerous financial institutions, 
among which Lehman Brothers stands out for its dimension and consequences, on 
September 2008. 
If, on the one hand, during Lehman Brothers crisis, the governmental and 
monetary authorities’ intervention was non-existent, leading to the institution collapse 
and generating an unprecedented systemic effect. In other situations, it was possible to 
mitigate this risk, even though with very high costs for the taxpayers. 
Amongst the most relevant cases in Portugal, BPN (Banco Português de 
Negócios) stands out. It would be nationalized (also in 2008) and became part of the 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos Balance sheet, to be afterwards alienated to BIC bank in 
2011. 
Concerned with the instability of the banking system, some international 
organizations (i.e. G-20 and Basel Committee) promoted a set of initiatives aiming the 
reform of the international financial system. 
G-20 requested FSB (Financial Stability Board) two reports, being the first one 
(Financial Stability Board, 2009) about the systemic importance of institutions, 
markets and instruments and the second one (Financial Stability Board, 2011) 
regarding the essential requirements of the efficacy of the bank resolution regime. 
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The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision has established in 2010 new 
prudential rules (Basel III, 2010) to be implemented progressively until 2019 
concerning: a) The reinforcement of capital requirements of the Credit Institutions; b) 
The definition of minimum liquidity ratios; c) The rise of the capital quality; d) The 
reduction of systemic risk; e) A transition period to adjust to the new rules. 
 
The regulatory framework in the European Union also included, within the 
SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism), the creation of the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB), aiming to monitor and assess the Systemic Risk, that is to say, to 
control the financial system exposure to the bankruptcy risk of systemic banks and 
thereby, to increase the financial system resistance to impacts and also to contribute to 
the financial stability (Regulation No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and 
Council)1. 
Hence, The European Union has elaborated a new regulatory framework of 
prevention, resolution and combating of the banking crisis, and as a result of it, a 









1 2008 crisis has brought to light the systemic risk prevention and combating. Under its 
performance, EU defines the systemic crisis as (European Parliament and of the Council, 2014b, p.213): 
"a disturbance in the financial system susceptible of having serious negative consequences in the 
internal market and real economy." 
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In the European Banking Union, there are three main pillars: 
 
• Pillar 1, represents the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which transfers 
the responsibility to oversee the Eurosystem Banking to an European level. This 
means that the ECB will have the role of supervision; 
 
• Pillar 2, represents the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which includes a 
set of legal rules: a) Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), 
Directive 2014/59/EU 15th May 2014; b) The Single Resolution Mechanism 
Regulation, Regulation (EU) No 806/20142; 
• Pillar 3, of Union Banking, foresees the creation of a European Deposit 
Guarantee System which constitutes a long-term objective (European Parliament 
and Council, 2009). Clients protection, specifically the depositors, in case of 
failing banks has been harmonized since 31st July 2010 and set at 100.000€ per 









2 It should be noted that regarding this matter and according to Santo, R. (2013: 6), "the 
recovery and resolution plans constitute an ex-ante act so that in a crisis scenario, the institution or 
banking group, through measurement and procedure planning, to its financial recovery and swift and 
orderly resolution, respectively". 
On the other hand, Freitas, J. (2014:110) refers that "it is essential the creation of a resolution 
mechanism to the European Union, to reach the objective of weakening the banking sector 
interdependence with the sovereign, and thereby deepen the financial integration in the MEU". 
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Taking into account the previous theoretical contextualization, the focus of 
this investigation is the Single Resolution Mechanism applied to BES/Novo Banco, 
which is considered to be the experimental case in the European Union.3 
It is important to mention that presented work, although it is not a new 
subject per se (Rocio, J. 2015), it shows a different approach, once it aims to do a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the concrete case. On the other hand, it is the 
first critical reflection on the subject developed after the approval of the selling of 


































3  In this situation, the introduction of the Single Resolution Mechanism expected to January 
2015, was anticipated to 3rd August 2014 and applied experimentally to BES/Novo Banco. 
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2. Statement of the Problem, Starting Questions and Purpose 
 
 
Grupo Banco Espírito Santo presented on 30th July 2014 a loss of 3.577,3 
million euros (attributable to BES shareholders) concerning the first semester of 
2014. This situation changed the BES capital ratios, both individual and 
consolidated, placing them below the minimum levels required by the Banco de 
Portugal, which were set at 7% for the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) and Tier 1 
(TI) and at 8% for the Total Capital Ratio (Appendix 1). 
 
Table I – BES and Grupo BES Capital Ratios (June 2014) 
 
 Consolidated Individual 
Common Equity Tier1 Ratio 5,1% 6,9% 
Tier1 Ratio 5,1% 6,9% 
Total Capital Ratio 6,5% 8,3% 





Given this situation, Banco Espírito Santo in order to meet liquidity needs 
had to use the emergency liquidity fund of Banco de Portugal, reaching around 3500 
million Euros on 1st August 2014. 
On the same date, BCE suspended the status of Counterparty of Banco 
Espírito Santo, SA with effect from 4th August 2014 and established the full and 
immediate reimbursement of BES credit with the Euro-system, representing nearly 
8000 million Euros. 
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Whereas, on the 3rd of August 2014, the Banco de Portugal applied a 
resolution measure to BES, as a partial transfer of its activity to a nominated 
transition bank, by the name of Novo Banco, S.A. (Novo Banco) 
For this reason and after a deliberation from Banco de Portugal, a very 
significant and substantial part of the assets, liabilities, off-balance sheet elements 
and assets under BES management were transferred to Novo Banco (Appendix 2). 
 
 
Along with this process, the assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet elements 
were transferred according to their book value. The assets were adjusted following 
provisions (Appendix 2). 
According to the accounting, the needs of capital of Novo Banco reached 
4.900 million Euros. The Resolution Fund financed these capital needs integrally. 
The objective of Novo Banco management (according to its statutes) was to 
preserve and value its asset value and capital ratios, allowing a future sale to other 
credit institution or institutions. 
 
In line with the previous statements, there are two specific questions that 
should be pointed: 
 
 Question 1 – How and why the experimental BES resolution? On which 
grounds it has been decided? 
 Question 2 – How and why the creation of a transition bank? Was the 
experimental BES resolution efficient? And effective? What type of 
assessment can be done? 
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The following objectives were formulated to give the best possible answers to the 
previous questions: 
• The first aim of this study is to analyze the authorities' decision on the BES 
intervention on 3rd August 2014, determining what ground the regulation and 
supervision authorities based on to make the decision. The reasons behind such 
resolution may be related to insolvency, liquidity risk, among others; 
• The second aim of this study is to evaluate the BES resolution from the 
resolution process results of the creation of Novo Banco. In this regard, we will analyze 
if the statutory management objective of Novo Banco preserved the asset value of the 
bank and its capital ratios, allowing a future sale to other credit institution or 
institutions; 
• The third aim of this study is to analyze the resolution mechanism as a 
possible measure to react to a future banking crisis. 
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3. Methodology and Investigation Methods 
 
 
Since this is an "experimental" case, it will be applied an exploratory, 
revealing and unique case study methodology. 
In this context, it was decided that the Case Study methodology is suitable 
for the present investigation, formulating two central questions: How and Why? - 
focusing on contemporary events and it doesn't require variables control or 
manipulation. 
Therefore, this scientific study has a descriptive part "How?" and an 
explanatory part "Why?”. It has some similarities with the "experimental" 
investigation model, but it requires much less control over the events or the 
variables. As it happens in experiences, the case studies are generalized to 
theoretical propositions rather than to populations. 
The present investigation doesn't aim to get external validity due to its 
revealing and unique case study characteristics. 
 
 
As a result, the drawing of this investigation has the following 
methodological goals: 
1. Internal validity: the information analysis aims to develop analysis 
standards and to produce explanations on the study object phenomenon; 
2. Construct validity: the data collection process uses different sources and 
seeks to establish chains of evidence; 
3. Reliability: in what concerns information collection, according to the 
case study protocol, with a specific database. 
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Qualitative and quantitative methods will follow through this investigation 
in both stages which represent this methodology protocol: 
 
 
 1st stage: Based on the BES financial statements (1st goal) and the 
Novo Banco financial statements (2nd goal). Afterwards, there are 
the quantitative methods for economic and financial analysis on an 
individual and a consolidated basis of the corresponding financial 
groups - grupo BES e grupo Novo Banco; 
 
 
 2nd stage: Evidence process by deductive and inductive inference of 
data and quantitative and qualitative produced and collected 
information. The inference process follows the data triangulation 
methodology, information and analysis generated through the 
investigation process (3rd goal). 
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4. Review of Previous Research 
 
 
4.1. Banking Regulation Theories 
 
Theoretically, Regulation can be defined as a set of specific rules or behaviors 
imposed by a government or an external agency or self-imposed (via tacit or explicit 
agreement, within an industry), that limit the activities and the operations of the 
financial institutions (Llewellyn, D., 1986). 
As primary objectives of the public policy of regulation the following stand out 
(Llewellyn, D., 1986): a) Efficiency; b) Diversity of selection; c) Competitive 
neutrality; d) Financial system stability; e) Macroeconomics stability; f) Social 
objectives. 
In spite of the controversial position in which the regulation and supervision 
today stand, from the theoretical point of view, various bibliographies identify two 
alternative theories of regulation. One being the Public Interest Theory, a normative 
theory, and the other one being the Capture Theory, a process theory. 
In what concerns the first perspective (Public Interest Theory), the role of 
regulation consists in compensating the market imperfections or flaws, which act in 







4  Even Adam Smith, in 1776, acknowledges the importance of governmental intervention on key 
sectors and public assets: “Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respects a violation of 
natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger the security 
of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments, of the most free as well as 
of the most despotic" (Adam Smith, 1776). 
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The most significant imperfections or market flaws identified are: 
 
• Inadequate and insufficient information, in a way that the technicality of the 
products makes it very difficult for a user to be truly informed regarding the quality 
and the assets price; 
• Negative externalities (users and institutions tend not to consider wider 
consequences); 




On the other hand, the Capture Theory suggests that whichever the regulation 
origin, and considering that initially regulated institutions may resist observance and 
following regulatory content, regulators are captured and induced to serve regulated 
institution's interests. 
There is extensive empirical evidence in the United States which supports this 
perspective. 
In effect, it is believed that Regulation and Supervision destabilize the financial 
system – (Barclay, C., 1978) and (Wall, L. and Eisenbeis, R. 1984), among others – and 
that specific types of regulation often doesn't achieve all its objectives. Sometimes it 
can also create anti-competitive situations, as a consequence of its own costs. 
Moreover and in some situations it is reasonable to consider that some measures 
or actions of Supervision and Regulation preserve a lot better the regulated 
institution's interests rather than the interests of final users (Llewellyn, D. 1986). 
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4.2 Regulation and Supervision Policies 
 
 
Both concepts, Regulation and Supervision are seen as instruments which 
aim the improvement of financial systems resistance, mitigating the impact of 
market gaps, such as systemic instability or poor use of resources (Kaufman, G. Et. 
Al, 1984). Within this perspective, the primary goal of banking regulation is to 
maintain the public's trust in the banking system. 
Thereby, the supervisory authorities of the financial system guide 
themselves according to three primary objectives: a) Safety - Depositors Protection; 
b) Stability - Safeguarding the Economy regarding the financial markets 
vicissitudes; c) Free Competition - Client's Protection from the Banking monopoly. 
 
 
So, it is intuitive to conclude these objectives, per se, may come into conflict 
every time competition questions the safety and system stability. In fact, legislators 
in the process of creating the legislation and considering the connection between the 
three objectives should aim for the balance to a competitive and safe banking 
system. 
Governmental regulations are mainly of 2 kinds: there are those which affect 
the banking sector market structure and those which are addressed directly to banks, 
by setting out ethical business conduct and correct commercial practices. 
For its part, the legal basis which affects the banking market structure lies in 
restricting the entrance in the industry, limiting branches opening and determining 
restrictive policies regarding fusions and acquisitions. 
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In another way, the mandatory regulation of the individual bank conduct 
restrict the types of business the institution can develop, protecting the liquidity or 
laying down capping of specific operations fees. 
Taking these aspects into account, it's possible to conclude that regulation 
has a limiting effect on the management freedom and the banking industry strategy. 
It further appears necessary to highlight the fact regulation is not free from 
adverse side effects, and it sometimes can cause new problems in the operation of 
the market itself. 
From the financial institution management point of view, the decision- 
making power of its leaders is limited by the restrictions imposed by the supervisory 
authorities. 
It's also important to highlight that banks are usually the favorite 
instruments of economic politics for the Finance Ministers, mainly as regards 
monetary policy as a way to combat inflation but also to protect currency or external 
balance (Vaz, J. 1987). 
Even though the obligation of respecting some coefficients (liquidity and 
solvability) is nothing more than the codification of the rules of banking knowledge, 
the financial system is limited numerous times in the light of external concerns on its 
own management. Consequently, have to adopt standards and criteria according to 
the economic and social environment or the theoretical concepts of supervisory 
authorities. 
If sometimes public authorities intervention translates into the adoption of 
restrictive incidence criteria of financial activity (currency reserves, credit policies, 
government bonds); not rarely authorities put pressure on the financial resources 
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aiming less severity on credit reimbursement or the financial intervention in 
countries or companies when their economic and financial situation wouldn't justify 
such kind of actions. 
For its part, central banks still have the dilemma of allowing banks to act free 
of restrictions and simultaneously trying to control the monetary situation. A 
dilemma which remains unsolved nowadays. 
Notwithstanding, it could be said that the financial systems have suffered 
significant changes, particularly the Portuguese banking system; firstly because of 
the radical transformation of its structure over the last thirty years, secondly due to 
its entrance in the European single market, lastly because of the 2008 crisis impact. 
This evolution has led to deregulation, favoring liberalization and 
competition and to a regulation that seeks out preserving safety and banking system 
stability. 
EEC/EU deregulation movement has brought new risks to the banks, 
primarily due to the changes in the global market structure, forcing them to compete 
with new banks but also with non-financial companies and governmental agencies 
that collect and lend funds in an increasingly global market. 
It can be said that it changed from the old financial regime, characterized by 
the regulation and segmentation of banking activity into a new financial regime 
linked to freedom and globalization of competition amongst the financial 
intermediary. 
Likewise, the recent technological breakthroughs which gave rise to new 
realities exponential development, such as the electronic payment equipment, home 
banking, digital crypto currency and electronic trading, cannot be forgotten since it 
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leads to a deep change in what concerns the contemporary financial systems 
functioning. 
Finally, the massive relocation of banking operation centers of the most 
prominent international players based on the outsourcing, in regions with significant 
cost advantages and financially worthwhile, also became an undeniable reality. It is 





4.3 European Union Banking Resolution 
 
 
The topic of the Banking Resolution forms part of the new EU legislative 
and regulatory framework, named Banking Union (European Parliament and 
Council, 2014a, 2014b) and materializes in the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM). It is founded on two legislative diplomas: a) Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD), nation-wide; b) Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation 
(SRMR), European-wide. 
The primary goal of BRRD is to harmonize banking resolution rules as well 
as the applicable procedures to every EU Member States. 
BRRD determined (ex-ante) the provision of a Resolution Fund per Member 
State, being its funding carried out primarily by (ex-ante) annual appropriations of 
authorized banks in the Member State and by (ex-post) additional appropriations. 
In the case of insufficient appropriations of the Member State banking 




In the case of Portugal, BRRD foresees that the Resolution Fund will have 
by 31st December 2024 an amount of 1.200 million Euros, equivalent to 1% of all 
guaranteed deposits of every national credit institutions. 
BRRD further provides that the Resolution Fund can only ever be used when 
the shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution have already 
incurred significant losses, over 8% (of the liability and equity). 
Accordingly, the amount which should be made available by the Resolution 
Fund may exceed 5% of the liability and equity. 
Given the expected assumptions in the beginning, and if the BES resolution 
hasn't gone through successfully (which is, if the sale haven't allowed the up-front 
money reimbursement, in full, to the Resolution Fund) there should be an obligation 
from the national financial institutions, to double its annual contributions to the 
Resolution Fund. 
On a practical level, BRRD identifies three stages of banking crisis 
intervention and management: a) Preparation and Prevention; b) Early Intervention; 
and c) Resolution. 
Therefore, on stage 1 - preparation and prevention, banks should prepare 
recovery plans, from both individual and group points of view. To the financial 
group internal supportive measures are authorized, in the form of funding, as well as 
the provision of guarantees. Moreover, the resolution authorities should also prepare 
resolution plans, also from both individual and group points of view. 
On stage 2, the supervisory authority has powers to intervene, which may 
require banking institutions to implement recovery plans already established. In this 
regard, it is common to designate a manager, chosen by the Supervisory authority - 
for a limited period of time. 
17  
Ultimately, on stage 3, in case of insufficiency and ineffectiveness of the 
previous stages, the supervisory authority decrees the resolution, whose procedures 
must be guided by the principles of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(European Parliament and Council, 2014 b). 
BRRD diploma also determines that, in the first place, the shareholders are 
the agents who should bear the losses of the resolution process. Secondly those 
losses should be absorbed by the subordinated creditors, thirdly by the unsecured 
creditors (senior debt) and lastly by the depositor with deposits over 100.000€. 
It's important to highlight the fact the small depositors and the small and 
medium-sized enterprises have preferential rights over big companies. 
Thus, the directive seeks to protect the small depositors, assuring protection 
of deposits below 100.000€, per depositor and per institution. 
Lastly, there is a criterion in order to safeguard the creditors who cannot 
incur in losses over those which could occur in a liquidation procedure. Following 
the Resolution process, BRRD determines the substitution of the members of the 
management body, except if their presence, all or part, is absolutely required for the 
objectives of the resolution process itself. 
Concerning BRRD, it is also required the clarification of responsibilities for 
the institution insolvency and the appropriate legal actions. 
In what concerns its scope, BRRD provides four instruments that can be 
applied after the resolution decree to an institution or financial group: 
a) The sale, total or partial; 
 
b) The establishment of a transitory bank, to which every asset value is 








d) The recapitalization of the new institution, dismissal of shareholders 
and liability reduction, through a debt-to-equity swap. 
If the resolution mechanism doesn't reach its objectives, there are two 
possible scenarios: a) Nationalization; or b) Sale off (Liquidation). 
Simultaneously, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has created a 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) - EU body of banking resolution involving every 
State Members as part of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Its entry into service 
was planned to 1st January 2006. 
Additionally, the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) defines, 
European-wide, a centralized mechanism of resolution to: a) Cross-border banking 
groups; b) Systemic Banks; e c) Non-Systemic Banks (by ECB decision). 
The SRMR also suggests the creation of a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) to 
facilitate a European-wide banking resolution process. Furthermore, the Single 
Resolution Fund shall reach the target level of at least 1% of the number of covered 
deposits of all credit institutions within the European Union, in eight years. 
As the SRF stands, it will be composed of contributions transfers and 
mutualisation to the national Resolution Funds. It shall have an appropriation of 
55.000 million Euros by the same period. 
 
Clearly, the resolution process applied to BES/Novo Banco was 
experimental regarding the BRRD national-wide and not of the SRMR European- 
wide. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
 
 
The empirical analysis focuses on answering the starting questions aiming to 
achieve the objectives of the study. 
The analysis of BES and Grupo BES accounts (Balance Sheet and Income 
Statement) – 5.1 – is essential to accomplish the first objective of this paper, which is 
to analyze the regulation and supervisory authorities decision on BES intervention 
on 3rd August 2014, applying the EU banking resolution model experimentally to 
BES. 
Additionally, the income statement analysis of Novo Banco and Grupo Novo 
Banco – 5.2. – is fundamental to pursue the second objective of the study, which is 
to examine BES resolution, from the objective elements of the resolution process 




5.1. BES and Grupo BES Accounts Analysis 
 
 
The study of BES and Grupo BES accounts allows analyzing the decision to 
move towards a resolution of BES on 3rd August 2014 and its fundaments. 
 
 




The meeting minute of BdP Adm. Board of 3rd August 2014 justified the 
resolution deliberation with the deterioration of capital ratios, shown by the 1st 
semester of 2014 accounts (Appendices 3 and 4). 
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The BES Balance Sheet, attached to the Meeting Minute (Appendix 2) 
presented, before the resolution, the following aggregates: 









Regarding this BES Balance Sheet, Banco de Portugal made a few 
adjustments to some balance sheet items on 30th June 2014, totaling the Asset 
variations in -4.419,543 million Euros and the Liabilities in -799,993 million Euros 
(net figures). 
In accordance, were excluded from the Balance Sheet: 
 
a) The equity value: 4.079,325 million Euros 
 




The sum of these two values (4.981,861 million Euros) justified the 
recapitalization of Novo Banco from the resulting amount of 4.900,000 million 
Euros and entirely borne by the Resolution Fund5. 
Since this discrepancy of 314,910 million Euros is not formally considered, 
it is possible to conclude that the amount would raise the Resolution Fund needs to 
5.296,771 million Euros. 
Having said this and analyzed the Income Statement of BES in the first 
semester of 2014, it is possible to conclude that the losses of 2.855,204 million 
5  It should be noted that the equity value of this BES balance sheet on 30th June 2014, attached to 
Meeting Minute of BdP, doesn't match with the BES equity value published, of just 3.764,415 million 
Euros. The difference is from the losses considered by Banco de Portugal (-2.540,294 million Euros) and 
by BES (-2.855,204 million Euros). 
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Euros are the result of the following items: 
 
Table 3 – BES Income Statement 1st Semestre, 2014 (million €) 
 Value 
Financial Margin 192,936 
Complementary Margin 147,613 
Operating income 340,549 
Operating expenses (385,221) 
Provisions and Impairments (3.670,450) 
Profit before income tax (3.715,122) 
Income tax 859,918 
Net Profit (2.855,204) 
Source: Annual Report published by BES – (Appendix 4) 
 
 
The figures are impressive, especially the provisions and impairments, only 










Grupo BES consolidated accounts show as well their economic and financial 
deterioration (Appendix 5 and 6). The consolidated balance sheet presented before 
the resolution, the following composition: 
Table 4 – Grupo BES Consolidated Balance Sheet on 31st December 2013 and 30th 
June 2014 (million €) 
 31/12/2013 30/06/2014 
Assets 80.608,016 80.216,280 
Liabilities 73.558,720 75.972,375 
Equity 7.049,296 4.243,905 
Source: Report and Accounts published by BES – (Appendix 5) 
 
 
Given the analysis of these values, it is clear the deterioration of the Equity 
level of BES in the first semester of 2014: 
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a) Equity net reduction of 2.805,391 million Euros, in other words, an 
amount corresponding 40% of the initial capital, 
b) The Equity represented, at resolution time, only 5% of the total group 
assets of the entire financial group. 
The Income Statement of the group, previous to the resolution, not only 
demonstrates it but also amplifies the pronounced economic disaster. 
Table 5 – Grupo BES Income Statement 1st semester 2014 (million €) 
 Value 
Financial Margin 287,002 
Complementary Margin (52,850) 
Operating income 234,152 
Operating expenses (594,836) 
Provisions and Impairments (4.253,445) 
Profit before income tax (4.591,309) 
Income tax 859,886 
Net Profit (3.741,049) 




It is remarkable to verify that the banking and insurance products were not 
sufficient to even cover the operating expenses of the semester. 
By expressing that relation through Cost to Income, we get to an unusual 
figure of 254%, when the average level of efficiency of the sector is around 65%. 
By adding the astronomical figures of provisions and impairment of that 
semester -4.253,445 million Euros, the consolidated losses of the semester rise to 
3.741,049 million Euros. 
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On the other hand, the solvability on 31st December 2013 suffered a 
substantial deterioration in the first semester of 2014, which can be analyzed 
through the following indicators (Appendix 1 and 15): 
 
Table 6 – Grupo BES Capital Ratios before Resolution 
 31/12/2013 30/6/2014 
CET 1 ratio 9,8% 5,1% 
Tier 1 ratio 10,4% 5,1% 
Total Capital Ratio 11,8% 6,5% 






The economic and financial analysis on an individual and consolidated basis 
leaves no doubts regarding the need of Banco de Portugal's intervention after BES 
accounting presentation on 30th June 2014. 
The BES Central Banks resources at the time rose to 8.339,115 million 
Euros. The statute suspension that the ECB applied to BES as a counterparty on 1st 
August 2014, with effects from the 4th August 2014, along with BES obligation to 
reimburse in full its credit with the Eurosystem on 4th August 2014, were decisive 





5.2. BES and Grupo Novo Banco Accounts Analysis 
 
 
Along with this topic, it shall become clear if the statutory objective of Novo 
Banco SA has preserved the bank's equity value and its capital ratios, allowing the 
future and profitable sale to another credit institution or institutions. 
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5.2.1 Novo Banco Economic and Financial Analysis (individual basis) 
 
 
The Income Statements (presented in million Euros) on 31st December 
2014, 31st December 2015 and 31st December 2016 (Appendices 10 and 11), 
provide the following conclusions concerning the major components: 
Table 7 – Novo Banco Income Statements (after BES Resolution) (million €) 







Financial Margin 173,636 247,682 374,834 
Complementary Margin 147,773 217,981 463,022 
Operating income 321,409 465,663 837,856 
Operating expenses (309,319) (664,811) (556,285) 
Provisions and Impairments (514,507) (899,493) (1.232,332) 
Profit before income tax (502,417) (1.118,641) (950761) 
Income tax (146,203) 108,000 206,017 
Net Profit (648,620) (1.064,641) (744,744) 




Novo Banco has begun its activity on 4th August 2014, after the Resolution 
of Banco de Portugal on 3rd August 2014. The decision had determined the BES 
asset value and responsibilities transferring, after sale off operations to BES balance 
sheet. 
In this respect, the Income Statement of Novo Banco on 31st December 2014 
mirrors its activity from 4th August 2014 to 31st December 2014. 
Therefore, it is essential to highlight the losses of Novo Banco, in the amount 
of 648,620 million Euros, of which the main causes were the provisions and the 
impairments of 514,507 million Euros. 
During 2015, Novo Banco continued to ruin the figures -1.064,641 million 
Euros losses - of which impairments and provisions raised to 899,493 million Euros 
and, again, banking products were not sufficient to cover the operating expenses and 
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meant a negative differential of 199,148 million Euros. 
 
In 2016, the situation got worse. Provisions and Impairments totalized 
1.232,332 million Euros, and losses of 744,744 million Euros have been registered. 
The equity value evolution, from 4th August 2014, included the destruction 
of the value shown in the Income Statement. But it also reflected the balance sheet 
restructuring which allowed the bank to maintain its relative equity levels on 31st 
December 2016. 
Let us, therefore, look at the balance sheets (Appendices 7, 8 and 9) in 
million Euros: 
Table 8 – Novo Banco Balance Sheet (summary) (after BES Resolution) (million €) 
 04/08/2014 31/12/2014 31/12/2015 31/12/2016 
Assets 62.709,369 56.290,848 50.996,332 46.843,311 
Liabilities 57.558,696 51.473,167 45.496,854 42.168,805 
Equity 5.150,673 4.817,681 5.499,478 4.674,706 




The balance sheet of Novo Banco shows a sharp decrease of the Assets and 
the Liabilities, at the relevant time, and consequently a reduction of the Equity of 
475,967 million Euros (9,2%). The damage can be observed in the accumulated 
losses of 2.458 million Euros. The assets decreased 15.866,058 million Euros, 
which means a decrease of 25% of the initial balance sheet and the liabilities 
decreased 15.389,896 million Euros, which means 26,7% lower than the initial 
balance sheet. 
 
The most prominent changes in the asset value were: 
 
a) In the Assets: Cash and deposits at central banks (-3.896,993 million Euros) and 
Loans and advances to customers (-2.071,297 million Euros); 
b) In the Liabilities: Deposits from central banks (-7.062,794 million Euros) and Debt 
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securities issued (-4.901,880 million Euros); 
 
c) In the Equity: The accumulated losses rose to 2.458 million Euros and were 
compensated by capital, retained income and other comprehensive income in the 
amount of 2.293,709 million Euros. 
In the light of these facts, Equity benefited from the changes made to the 
reserves: 
- The first, by a decision of Banco de Portugal on 22nd December 2014, 
which translated into a positive variation of 548,300 million Euros as a consequence 
of BES activity and were not transferred to Novo Banco; 
- The second, by a decision of Banco de Portugal on 29th December 2015, 
which turned into a positive variation of 1.948,236 million Euros consisting in the 
retransmission of non-subordinated bonds to BES, issued by itself. 
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The Income Statements on 31st December 2014, 31st December 2015 and 
31st December 2016 (Appendices 12, 13 and 14) allow the following findings:  










Source: Annual Report published by Novo Banco – (Appendix 14 and 16) 
 
 
For the reasons set out by the Banco de Portugal regarding the Resolution 
decision on 3rd August 2014, the Income Statement of Grupo Novo Banco on 31st 
December 2014, demonstrates the group's activity from 4th August 2014 to 31st 
December 2014. 
The group's level of Income (banking and insurance products) in 2015 got 
close to the Income value, on 2014 (from August to December). Consequently, there 
was a significant relative decrease, regarding the group's activity in 2015, although 
there was a slight improvement in 2016. 
The Cost to Income ratio reached great levels in 2014 of 43,7%. However, in 
2015, the same ratio showed low levels of efficiency and productivity of 91,1% and 
afterwards in 2016 of 64%, proving the cost controlling improvement. 
 
 
 31/12/2014 31/12/2015 31/12/2016 
Financial Margin 265,460 450,652 514,484 
Complementary Margin 546,052 377,628 408,064 
Operating income 811,512 828,280 922,548 
Operating expenses (355,401) (754,661) (590,876) 
Provisions and 
Impairments 
(699,051) (1.057,932) (1.374,709) 
Profit before income tax (237,719) (967,410) (1.014,638) 
Income tax 215,460 20,091 227,594 
Discontinued Operations (46,469) 3,026 (10,427) 
Co solidated Result (499,648) (944,293) (797,471) 
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It is important to point out that in 2014, Grupo Novo Banco presented losses 
of 499,648 million Euros and the leading causes were the impairments and 
provisions of 699,051 million Euros. In 2015, the losses rose sharply to 944,293 
million Euros, having impairments and provisions been the primary cause again in 
the amount of 1.057,932 million Euros on 31st December 2016. By that date, the 
losses reached the amount of 797,471 million Euros, and the impairments reached 
1.374,709 million Euros. 
In the same period, the impairments of the group cumulatively rose to 
3.131,692 million Euros, and the capital net value loss was of 2.241,412 million 
Euros. 
The evolution of the equity value since 4th August 2014 included the 
destruction in value reflected in the Income Statements of the Grupo Novo Banco 
but also the balance sheets restructuring operations, which allowed the maintenance 
of the equity relative value until 31st December 2016. 
Looking at the balance sheet, it is possible to observe the following: 
 
 
Table  10  –  Grupo  Novo  Banco  Balance  Sheet  (summary) (after BES Resolution) 
(million €) 
 4/8/2014 31/12/2014 31/12/2015 31/12/2016 
Assets 72.465,236 65.417,480 57.517,090 52.332,672 
Liabilities 66.887,841 60.009,422 51.581,716 52.332,672 
Equity 5.577,395 5.409,813 5.935,374 5.147,953 




In the same period, the balance sheet of Grupo Novo Banco suffered a sharp 
decrease on Assets and Liabilities. The strategy of contraction of their balance 
sheets allowed the maintenance of the equity relative value. 
In spite of the destruction in value observed in the accumulated losses of 
2.241,412 million Euros, the level of equity was very close to its initial value. 
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The Assets lost 20.132,564 million Euros, which represents 27,78% of the 
initial balance sheet and the Liabilities lost 19.703,122 million Euros, which 
represents 29,45% of the initial balance sheet. 
The most significant amount variations in the period took place: 
 
a) In the Assets: Cash and deposits at central banks (-3.931,997 million 
Euros) and Loans and advances to customers (-10.385,005 million Euros); 
b) In the Liabilities: Deposits from central banks (-7.414,343 million 
Euros) and Debt securities issued (-7.335,770 million Euros); 
c) In the Equity: The accumulated losses rose to 2.241,412 million Euros 
and were compensated by capital increasing processes, retained income and other 
comprehensive income in the amount of 2.849,632 million Euros. This means the 
level of equity has been kept very close to its initial value. 
As observed previously, the equity benefited from the changes made to the 
reserves, the first of 548,300 million Euros on 22nd December 2014 and the second 





Both balance sheet restructuring and reserve operations allowed improving 
solvability and capital ratios. CET1 (Common Equity Tier 1), shows an 
improvement trend: 9,5% on 31st December 2014, 13,5% on 31st December 2015 
and 12,0% on 31st December 2016 (Appendices 16, 17, 18 and 19). 
 
A different version of this ratio, CET1 (full implementation), was estimated 
in 7,5% on 31st December 2014, 11,3% on 31st December 2015 and 10,2% on 31st 
December 2016. 
 
Thereby, the asset value (net) of the bank and its capital ratios were 
preserved till 31st December 2016. The protection of the capital relative value was 
only possible due to a strong asset reduction of around 28%. 
Grupo Novo Banco follows a divestment and deleveraging approach, 
"aiming the organizational simplification and capital preservation of Novo Banco". 
The assets considered to be non-strategic should be disposed of, discontinued or 
settled, although considering its value maximization. 
On 31st December 2015, non-strategic assets were valued at 10.800 million 
Euros, and it was expected a reduction in 2016 to 8.737 million Euros. 
In 2016 a restructuring plan was put into practice which reduced the 
operating expenses by 150 million Euros, rearranging the branch's network to 537 
offices and reducing the number of employees by 1312 people, keeping a total of 
6096 employees. 
Meanwhile, the bank's activity, as well as the financial group, never achieved 
the desired level of profitability and efficiency to draw the attention of a higher 
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number of buyers and mostly to attract more advantageous proposals to the 
Portuguese government and also to every agent affected during the resolution 
process. 
Additionally, the impairment recognition was not clearly defined and 
implemented, continuing, because of that, to threat the statutory capital of Novo 
Banco. 
On the other hand, it is possible to say that the Novo Banco, in 2016, is not 
the same bank it was after the resolution on 4th August 2014. Grupo Novo Banco 
lost 28% of its assets reaching the amount of 20.133 million Euros. The restructuring 
process of the initiated balance sheet reduced the asset value dramatically. The 
process remains and demands a global reorganization of the institution, and it will 
have a predictable impact over the next year’s results. 
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6. Discussion of Results – The Bank Resolution Mechanism 
 
 
The third objective of this investigation is to analyze the EU resolution 
mechanism through the experimental case-study of BES/Novo Banco. For this 
purpose, it was used the economic and financial analysis previously produced along 
with the review of the literature and other quantitative and qualitative information 
gathered. 
 
a) The first fact to be taken into consideration is the fact that the resolution 
instrument applied to BES was not the resolution mechanism of the Banking 
Union, European-wide. It was a resolution mechanism exclusively national- 
wide, although obeying the same principles. For that reason, it has a reduced 
intervention capacity and focuses the risks in the national institutions,  
banking system and State (taxpayers); 
b) The EU resolution mechanism philosophy, as we have seen, is based on the 
establishment of a hierarchy of creditors. The shareholders and the 
subordinated debt holders, when in case of a regulation and supervisory 
authority’s intervention, are the first to be affected, while the depositors and 
the unsecured creditors are protected as much as possible. In what concerns 
BES, the shareholders and the subordinated creditors were excluded from the 
Novo Banco balance sheet and the Resolution Fund was constituted as Novo 
Banco capital only after that action. It was just during the resolution period 
that the unsecured creditors came to be affected, in order to compensate 
impairments and losses regarding 2015 financial year; 
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c) The resolution mechanism philosophy, concerning what it has been done in 
Portugal, generates litigation phenomena with the creditors that can try to 
recover part or the full amount of their credits, although, there cannot be 
losses above the ones that would come out from the liquidation of the bank. 
As a way of minimizing the consequences, I believe a negotiation of the 
Resolution Authority with the creditors that would allow the claim for equity 
(provided for in the Directive) would have significant advantages for the 
resolution itself - either from the financial or from the negotiating points of 
view - with potential buyers; 
d) Although it's an area outside the scope of this study, it should be noted the 
inherent problematic about the emergence of conglomerates, which is when 
banks expose themselves and other non-financial companies of the group to 
contaminations from non-performing assets. This phenomenon was observed 
numerous times in the BES group with the sharing of risks amongst the 
conglomerate companies, which resulted in a disaster regarding the 
accumulation of liabilities transferences. In the particular case of BES, this 
aspect has greatly penalized the non-financial companies, for instance, in the 
insurance and health business. In fact, the emergence of these economic 
groups is only sustainable in case of a ring fence clearly defined, allowing to 







e) Since the Portuguese banking system is still greatly weakened in 2017 and 
recognizing its high impairments resulting from the speculative bubbles of 
the different markets requiring capital "apports" in its different ways, the 
resolution might turn out a large-scale relocation of capital property rights from 
banks to foreign hands; 
f) EU's prime instrument to act on the systemic risk banks is the Single 
Resolution Mechanism. Thereafter, on the exhaustion of this instrument, it 
follows the sale off mechanism. The states also possess other intervention 
measures, such as providing guarantees, using financing mechanisms from 
Central Banks, markets or subscribing convertible bonds (CoCos). 
Nationalization, full or in part of banks is not a desirable solution to EU. 
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7. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Developments 
 
 
BES and Grupo BES financial and economic situation, in the first semester 
of 2014, expressed a profound deterioration. Regardless the shareholders’ efforts to 
raising capital (Appendix 21), they were not enough to face up to high level of 
impairments, known so far. 
After BES resolution, the restructuring operations to the balance sheet and 
reserves allowed solvability and capital ratios improvement. Thereby the equity 
value of the bank and its capital ratios were preserved till 31st December 2016. 
However, only then it was possible to protect the capital relative value, with a 
substantial assets reduction as well as Novo Banco's size, by 28%. 
If that would allow, per se, to accomplish the statutory objective of future 
disposal to one or more credit institutions, the sale and the loan compensation to the 
State of around 3.900 million Euros, which were given to the Resolution Fund, 
would be particularly doubtful. The mentioned loan had already been registered in 
the 2014 public accounts as an expense, in the deficit and debt. 
In fact, the impairment recognition process was not yet finished, and it 
continues to threaten the statutory capital of Novo Banco. 
From the outset, the non-strategic asset disposal/winding-up, of 8.737 
million Euros (on 31st December 2016) has contributed to impairment recognition. 
On the other hand, both bank and group's activity never got to achieve 
acceptable levels of profitability to attract the interest of various buyers. This aspect 






Another constraint, important to mention, is the market in which Novo  
Banco is operating (Portuguese). It is a domestic, small and at saturation point 
market (a lot of banks operating and competing between each other). As a result it is 
considered unattractive concerning value perception to a large number of financial 
institutions, Europeans or global. 
This is, in my perspective, one of the most considerable problems of the 
Portuguese banking system. In the long-term, it is predictable a drop in the number 
of credit institutions in the market, and fusions and operations that help to get more 
significant and competitive players should be privileged in a global banking 
industry. 
Every reason above has strongly compromised the sale of Novo Banco. On 
31st March 2017, Lone Star fund paid nothing for the purchase of 75% of the 
statutory capital of Novo Banco. Lone Star has committed only to strengthen Novo 
Banco’s equity base in 1.000 million Euros. 
In fact, the Portuguese State was not able to recover its loan to the 
Resolution Fund (in the amount of 3.900 million Euros) on the occasion of the sale. 
Also, the banks - contributors to the fund - also were not able to recover their 1.000 
million Euros. The Resolution Fund will not, however, recognize those amounts as 
losses, because banks were granted 30 years to amortize the loan of the State to the 
Resolution Fund. 
Since banks may deduct these contributions to the Resolution Fund along 
each year results, and consequently reducing their own results and IRC tax to the 
State, it is clear to consider that taxpayers will still be affected. 
Therefore, this solution is proven to be a disadvantage from the national 
interest point of view, due to a decrease in the tax revenue. 
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In order to cover impairments resulting from the non-strategic activities 
management, called “side bank”, the Resolution Fund, a public organism, provides 
under the sales contract an additional guarantee of 3.890 million Euros to Novo 
Banco. For that, the State gets a 25% compensation of the Resolution Fund. This 
solution enabled to overcome the rules of the Resolution Directive, which limited 
the State intervention in a 3.900 million Euros loan. 
On the 7th October 2017, the European Commission has issued a statement 
confirming the sale approval of 75% of the Novo Banco's capital to Lone Star 
Group. As mentioned previously, when the preliminary purchase agreement was 
signed, an additional guarantee provided by the State, was also confirmed. 
Concerning that deal, the European Commission enables a solution in which there is 
a commitment by the Portuguese State to carry out contingency influx of capital for 
the sake of the bank's medium-term sustainability. 
Furthermore, this is no more than an operating subsidy from the State to 
Lone Star, taking the risk for a bank outside the public domain. 
Another point we shouldn't ignore focuses on the role that the large auditing 
firms (commonly known as "big four") have while delivering services to banks. On 
the other hand, once banks are one of their major clients, representing a large 
percentage of their annual income, it is possible to conclude the existence of a 
significant and perverse conflict of interest between both parties. 
Given that, a scenario where the auditing of financial institutions could be 
performed exclusively by the State might help to eliminate this phenomenon. 
A natural limitation of an experimental case study is the impossibility to get 
statistical generalizations. The methodological objective of a single case study is to 
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obtain a high level of internal validity and reliability. On the other hand, the 
development of other case studies on the same topic might help to get also external 
validity through multiple scenario methods. 
At last, it should be pointed that the object of study could be explored from 
other fields’ perspective contributing to the development of that same external 
validity. Some examples are the legal framework around the banking resolution and 
the Agency Theory on the understanding and compatibility between shareholders 
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Appendix 6 – Grupo BES Income Statement, on 30th June 2014  
GRUPO BES 
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Appendix 7 – Novo Banco, S.A. Balance Sheet 




NOVO BANCO, S.A. 
BALANÇO 
EM 4 DE AGOSTO DE 2014 
  
  (milhares de euros) 
 Notas 04.08.2014 
Ativo   
Caixa e disponibilidades em bancos centrais 4 5 361 395 
Disponibilidades em outras instituições de crédito 5 369 414 
Ativos financeiros detidos para negociação 6 1 274 803 
Outros ativos financeiros ao justo valor através de resultados 7 1 541 803 
Ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 8 8 287 546 
Aplicações em instituições de crédito 9 2 598 473 
Crédito a clientes 10 33 484 839 
Derivados para gestão de risco 11 353 090 
Ativos não correntes detidos para venda 12 1 167 172 
Outros Ativos tangíveis 13 315 311 
Ativos intangíveis 14 102 043 
Investimentos em subsidiárias e associadas 15 1 798 817 
Ativos por impostos correntes 22 14 818 
Ativos por impostos diferidos 22 2 863 931 
Outros ativos 16 3 175 914 
Total de Ativo 
 
62 709 369 
Passivo   
Recursos de bancos centrais 17 13 472 827 
Passivos financeiros detidos para negociação 6 1 087 235 
Recursos de outras instituições de crédito 18 5 365 817 
Recursos de clientes 19 26 847 070 
Responsabilidades representadas por títulos 20 7 927 383 
Passivos financeiros associados a ativos transferidos  271 802 
Derivados para gestão de risco 11 83 307 
Provisões 21 1 265 053 
Passivos por impostos correntes 22 18 326 
Passivos por impostos diferidos 22 245 080 
Outros passivos 23 974 796 
Total de Passivo 
 
57 558 696 
Capital Próprio 
  
Capital 24 4 900 000 
Reservas, resultados transitados e outro rendimento integral 25   250 673 
Total de Capital Próprio  5 150 673 
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Appendix 8 – Novo Banco, S.A. Balance Sheet 
on 31st December 2014 and on 31st December 
 2015 
 
NOVO BANCO, S.A. 
BALANÇO EM 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2015 E 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2014 




 Notas 31.12.2015  31.12.2014 
Ativo 






2 724 884 
Disponibilidades em outras instituições de crédito 17 132 753  214 258 
Ativos financeiros detidos para negociação 18 787 083  1 295 491 
Outros ativos financeiros ao justo valor através de resultados 19 227 393  1 245 882 
Ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 20 10 594 931  7 564 670 
Aplicações em instituições de crédito 21 2 548 148  2 830 785 
Crédito a clientes 22 28 272 583  31 341 787 
Derivados para gestão de risco 23 322 055  405 235 
Ativos não correntes detidos para venda 24 1 252 050  1 713 729 
Outros Ativos tangíveis 25 229 560  304 889 
Ativos intangíveis 26 68 469  99 918 
Investimentos em subsidiárias e associadas 27 1 415 763  1 382 675 
Ativos por impostos correntes 34 1 529  14 928 
Ativos por impostos diferidos 34 2 566 944  2 532 431 
Outros ativos 28 2 118 206  2 619 286 
Total de Ativo 
 
51 275 827 
 
56 290 848 
Passivo 




7 485 794 
  
8 471 659 
Passivos financeiros detidos para negociação 18 758 446  1 078 260 
Recursos de outras instituições de crédito 30 5 129 860  4 347 939 
Recursos de clientes 31 27 237 874  27 838 824 
Responsabilidades representadas por títulos 32 3 489 565  7 785 141 
Passivos financeiros associados a ativos transferidos  168 565  230 555 
vados para gestão de risco 23 77 846  104 669 
Provisões 33 689 352  825 947 
Passivos por impostos correntes 34 29 803  25 537 
Passivos por impostos diferidos 34 78 956  77 096 
Outros passivos 35 618 018  687 540 
Total de Passivo 
 
45 764 079 
 






4 900 000 
  
4 900 000 
ervas, resultados transitados e outro rendimento integral 37 1 727 408  566 301 
Resultado líquido do período    (1 115 660)    ( 648620) 
Total de Capital Próprio  5 511 748  4 817 681 
 
Total de Passivo e Capital Próprio 
  
51 275 827 
  
56 290 848 
 
 
As notas explicativas anexas fazem parte integrante destas demonstrações financeiras 
Relatório de Gestão – Relatório e Contas 2016 115  
Appendix 9 – Novo Banco, S.A. Individual Balance Sheet on 31st December 2015 and 2016 
 
10.2. Demonstrações Financeiras Individuais 
 
NOVO BANCO, S.A. 
BALANÇO INDIVIDUAL EM 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2015 E DE 2016 
 
  milhares de euros 
  
31 de dezembro de 2016 
 
















Caixa e disponibilidades bancos centrais 
 
 










Disponibilidades em outras instituições de crédito 116 774  -  116 774  132 753 
Ativos financeiros detidos para negociação 665 364  -  665 364  787 083 
Outros ativos financeiros ao justo valor através de resultados 4 876  -  4 876  227 393 
Ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 11 479 651  1 508 952  9 970 699  10 594 931 
Aplicações em Instituições de Crédito 1 798 037  472 414  1 325 623  2 548 148 
Crédito a clientes 31 413 542  5 508 133  25 905 409  28 005 358 
Investimentos detidos até à maturidade -  -  -  - 
Ativos com acordo de recompra -  -  -  - 
Derivados de cobertura 223 583  -  223 583  322 055 
Ativos não correntes detidos para venda 94 868  10 394  84 474  1 252 050 
Propriedades de investimento -  -  -  - 
Outros ativos tangíveis 913 371  713 688  199 683  229 560 
Ativos intangíveis 728 641  686 316  42 325  68 469 
Investimentos em filiais, associadas e empreendimentos conjuntos 1 430 681  263 236  1 167 445  1 415 763 
Ativos por impostos correntes 10 201  -  10 201  1 528 
Ativos por impostos diferidos 2 636 686  -  2 636 686  2 554 675 
Outros ativos 3 571 169  545 402  3 025 767  2 118 206 
TOTAL DE ATIVO 
 
56 551 846 
  
9 708 535 
  
46 843 311 
  
50 996 332 
        
PASSIVO        
Recursos de bancos centrais 6 410 033  -  6 410 033  7 485 794 
Passivos financeiros detidos para negociação 
Outros passivos financeiros ao justo valor através de resultados 
Recursos de outras instituições de crédito 
645 359 
- 




 645 359 
- 
4 694 253 
 758 446 
- 
5 129 860 
Recursos de clientes e outros empréstimos 25 599 957  -  25 599 957  27 237 874 
Responsabilidades representadas por títulos 3 025 503  -  3 025 503  3 489 565 
Passivos financeiros associados a ativos transferidos 685 588  -  685 588  168 565 
Derivados de cobertura 








 108 263 
- 
334 546 
 77 846 
- 
422 127 
Passivos por impostos correntes 12 852  -  12 852  29 803 
Passivos por impostos diferidos 
Instrumentos representativos de capital 


















TOTAL DE PASSIVO 42 168 605  - 
 
42 168 605 
 
45 496 854 
CAPITAL        
Capital 
Prémios de emissão 
Outros instrumentos de capital 
Ações próprias 
Reservas de reavaliação 














( 340 618) 




( 242 714) 
Outras reservas e resultados transitados 860 068  -  860 068  1 906 833 
Resultado do exercício 
Dividendos antecipados 




 ( 744 744) 
- 
 ( 1 064 641) 
- 
TOTAL DE CAPITAL 4 674 706  - 
 4 674 706  5 499 478 
        
TOTAL DE PASSIVO + CAPITAL 46 843 311  -  46 843 311  50 996 332 
* Valores reexpressos 
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NOVO BANCO, S.A. 
DEMONSTRAÇÃO DOS RESULTADOS DO PERÍODO DE 4 DE AGOSTO A 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2014 E DO 
EXERCÍCIO FINDO EM 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2015 
 
 
  (milhares de euros) 
 
 Notas 31.12.2015  31.12.2014 
 




1 148 168 
  
639 666 
Juros e custos similares 4   900 486    466 030 
Margem financeira  247 682  173 636 
Rendimentos de instrumentos de capital 5 50 832 
 
7 474 
Rendimentos de serviços e comissões 6 392 745  178 534 
Encargos com serviços e comissões 6 ( 98 228)  ( 43 803) 
Resultados de ativos e passivos ao justo valor através de resultados 7 ( 55 961)  ( 29 023) 
Resultados de ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 8 ( 13 625)  22 375 
Resultados de reavaliação cambial 9 ( 7 445)  32 466 
ltados de alienação de outros ativos 10 10 030  ( 896) 
Outros resultados de exploração 11   ( 60 367)    ( 19 354) 





Custos com pessoal 12 ( 333 650) 
 
( 147 747) 
Gastos gerais administrativos 14 ( 264 757)  ( 126 219) 
Depreciações e am ortizações 25 e 26 ( 66 404)  ( 35 353) 
Provisões líquidas de anulações 33 ( 41 264)  369 529 
ridade do crédito líquida de reversões 22 ( 469 610)  ( 446 721) 
ridade de outros ativos financeiros líquida de reversões 20 e 21 ( 288 976)  ( 301 237) 
ridade de outros ativos líquida de reversões 24, 27 e 28   ( 119 643)    ( 136 078) 
Custos operacionais 
 
( 1 584 304) 
 
( 823 826) 
Resultado antes de impostos 
 
( 1 118 641) 
 
( 502 417) 
Impostos sobre o rendimento 
    
Correntes 34 ( 12 178)  ( 16 395) 




( 146 203) 
Resultado líquido do período 
 
( 1 115 660) 
 
( 648 620) 
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Appendix 11 – Novo Banco, S.A. Individual Income Statements on 
31st December 2015 and on 31st December 2016 
 
NOVO BANCO, S.A. 
 
DEMONSTRAÇÃO DE RESULT ADOS INDIVIDUAL EM 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2015 E DE 2016 
 
 
  milhares  de euros 
 
31.12.2016 31.12.2015 * 
Juros e rendimentos similares 973 798 1 148 168 
Juros e encargos similares   598 964 900 486 
 
Margem financeira 374 834 247 682 
Rendimentos de instrumentos de capital 159 838 50 832 
Rendimentos de serviços e comissões 335 932 392 745 
Encargos com serviços e comissões 91 136 98 228 
Resultados de ativos e passivos avaliados ao justo valor através de resultados 101 210 ( 55 961) 
Resultados de ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 11 593 ( 13 625) 
Resultados de reavaliação cambial 5 004 ( 7 445) 
Resultados de alienação de outros ativos ( 15 558) 10 030 
Outros resultados de exploração ( 43 861) ( 60 367) 
Produto bancário 837 856 465 663 
Custos com pessoal 267 424 333 650 
Gastos gerais administrativos 234 903 264 757 
A mortizações do exercício 53 958 66 404 
Provisões líquidas de reposições e anulações 50 902 ( 18 163) 
Imparidade do crédito líquida de reversãoes e recuperações 555 873 529 037 
Imparidade de outros ativos financeiros líquida de reversões e recuperações 379 035 288 976 
Imparidade de outros ativos líquida de reversões e recuperações 246 522 119 643 
Resultado antes de impostos ( 950 761) ( 1 118 641) 
Impostos ( 206 017) ( 54 000) 
Correntes 6 888 12 179 
Diferidos ( 212 905) ( 66 179) 
Resultado após impostos ( 744 744) ( 1 064 641) 
do qual: Resultado após impostos de operações descontinuadas ( 8 642) 6 865 
* Valores reexpressos 
 
O Técnico Oficial de Contas O Conselho de Administração 
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Appendix 12 – Grupo Novo Banco Balance Sheet (initial Statement), on 4th August 
2014 
31 de dezembro de 2015 Notas Explicativas Consolidadas 126  
Appendix 13 – Grupo Novo Banco Balance Sheet 
on 31st December 2014 and 2015 
 
GRUPO NOVO BANCO 
BALANÇO CONSOLIDADO 
EM 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2015 E 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2014 
  (milhares de euros) 
 
 Notas 31.12.2015  31.12.2014 
Ativo 
    
Caixa e disponibilidades em bancos centrais 19 775 608  2 747 077 
Disponibilidades em outras instituições de crédito 20 340 209  490 856 
Ativos financeiros detidos para negociação 21 775 039  1 062 517 
Outros ativos financeiros ao justo valor através de resultados 22 1 526 193  2 230 388 
Ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 23 11 810 712  9 478 469 
Aplicações em instituições de crédito 24 1 690 628  1 044 286 
Crédito a clientes 25 31 583 759  34 929 314 
Derivados para gestão de risco 26 318 596  404 582 
Ativos não correntes detidos para venda 27 3 182 479  2 747 168 
Ativos de unidades em descontinuação 53 40 327  4 209 800 
Propriedades de investimento 28 54 625  297 133 
Outros ativos tangíveis 29 312 437  397 088 
Ativos intangíveis 30 221 168  253 732 
Investimentos em associadas 31 405 486  402 289 
Ativos por impostos correntes 40 38 848  29 962 
Ativos por impostos diferidos 40 2 535 423  2 505 608 
Provisões técnicas de resseguro cedido 32 7 696  8 038 
Outros ativos 33 1 910 126  2 179 173 
Devedores por seguro direto e indireto  3 019  1 263 
Outros activos  1 907 107  2 177 910 
Total de Ativo 
 
57 529 359 
 
65 417 480 
Passivo 
    
Recursos de bancos centrais 34 7 632 794  8 611 709 
Passivos financeiros detidos para negociação 21 743 860  1 045 648 
Recursos de outras instituições de crédito 35 4 157 132  2 623 864 
Recursos de clientes 36 27 582 142  27 938 053 
Responsabilidades representadas por títulos 37 4 224 658  9 032 956 
Derivados para gestão de risco 26 77 846  104 140 
Contratos de investimento 38 4 043 488  4 379 442 
Passivos não correntes detidos para venda 27 162 709  330 903 
Passivos de unidades em descontinuação 53 92 893  3 072 720 
Provisões 39 465 114  409 723 
Provisões técnicas 32 1 344 216  1 461 070 
Passivos por impostos correntes 40 38 643  34 273 
Passivos por impostos diferidos 40 12 336  50 309 
Passivos subordinados 41 56 260  54 794 
Outros passivos 42 947 625  858 063 
Credores por seguro direto e indireto  17 301  10 132 
Outros passivos  930 324  847 931 
Total de Passivo 
 
51 581 716 
 
60 007 667 
Capital Próprio 
    
Capital 43 4 900 000  4 900 000 
Reservas, resultados transitados e outro rendim ento integral 44 1 971 620  878 012 
Resultado líquido do período atribuível aos acionistas do Banco  ( 980 558)  ( 497 645) 
Total de Capital Próprio atribuível aos acionistas do Banco 
 
5 891 062 
 
5 280 367 
Interesses que não controlam 44 56 581 
 
129 446 
Total de Capital Próprio 
 
5 947 643 
 
5 409 813 
Total de Passivo e Capital Próprio 
 
57 529 359 
 
65 417 480 
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GRUPO NOVO BANCO 
 
DEMONSTRAÇÃO DOS RESULTADOS CONSOLIDADOS 
DOS PERÍODOS DE 4 DE AGOSTO DE 2014 A 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2014 E 1 DE JANEIRO DE 2015 A 31 DE 
DEZEMBRO DE 2015 
 
  (milhares de euros) 
 
 Notas 31.12.2015  31.12.2014 
 




1 443 156 
  
781 667 











Rendimentos de serviços e comissões 6 471 499  225 331 
Encargos com serviços e comissões 6 ( 133 454)  ( 56 423) 
Resultados de ativos e passivos ao justo valor através de resultados 7 ( 84 161)  ( 21 207) 
Resultados de ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 8 230 761  34 213 
Resultados de reavaliação cambial 9 30 092  75 119 
Resultados de alienação de outros ativos 10 ( 12 341)  5 642 
Prémios líquidos de resseguro 11 38 326  17 799 
Custos com sinistros líquidos de resseguro 12 ( 237 016)  ( 273 706) 
Variação das provisões técnicas líquidas de resseguro 13 166 092  239 264 
Outros resultados de exploração 14 ( 103 701)  295 246 





Custos com pessoal 15 ( 397 564) 
 
( 178 055) 
Gastos gerais administrativos 17 ( 285 384)  ( 139 496) 
Depreciações e amortizações 29 e 30 ( 71 713)  ( 37 850) 
Provisões líquidas de anulações 39 54 512  35 163 
Imparidade do crédito líquida de reversões 25 ( 739 323)  ( 378 120) 
Imparidade de outros ativos financeiros líquida de reversões 23 e 24 ( 313 049)  ( 262 500) 
Imparidade de outros ativos líquida de reversões 27, 30, 31 e 33 ( 60 072)  ( 93 594) 
Custos operacionais 
 
(1 812 593) 
 
(1 054 452) 
Alienação de subsidiárias e associadas 1 33 
 
- 
Resultados da aquisição por etapas de controlo em subsidiárias 1 222  - 
Resultados de associadas mensuradas pelo método de equivalência patrimonial  31 16 648  5 221 
Resultado antes de impostos e de interesses que não controlam 
 
( 967 410) 
 
( 237 719) 
Impostos sobre o rendimento 
    
Correntes 40 ( 58 582)  ( 28 885) 
Diferidos 40 27 654  ( 186 575) 
  
( 30 928) 
 
( 215 460) 
Resultado de atividades em continuação 
 
( 998 338) 
 
( 453 179) 
Resultado de atividades descontinuadas 27 ( 18 763)  143 
Resultado de atividades em descontinuação 53 21 789  ( 46 612) 
 
Resultado líquido do período 
  
( 995 312) 
  
( 499 648) 
 
Atribuível aos acionistas do Banco 
  
( 980 558) 
  
( 497 645) 
Atribuível aos interesses que não controlam 44 ( 14 754)  ( 2 003) 
  
( 995 312) 
 
( 499 648) 
 
 










Resultados por ação diluídos (em euros) 18 (0,20)  (0,10) 
Resultados por ação básicos de atividades em continuação (em euros) 18 (0,20) 
 
(0,09) 
Resultados por ação diluídos de atividades em continuação (em euros) 18 (0,20)  (0,09) 
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Appendix 15 – Grupo Novo Banco Balance Sheet on 31st December 2016 
 
O Demonstrações Financeiras 
 
10.1. Demonstrações Financeiras Consolidadas 
NOVO BANCO, S.A. 
BALANÇO CONSOLIDADO EM 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2015 E DE 2016 
 







Caixa e disponibilidades em bancos centrais 
 
 





Disponibilidades em outras instituições de crédito 370 918  340 209  
Ativos financeiros detidos para negociação 656 722  775 039  
Outros ativos financeiros ao justo valor através de resultados 1 203 807  1 526 193  
Ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 10 557 972  11 810 712  
Aplicações em instituições de crédito 724 167  1 690 628  
Crédito a clientes 28 184 426  31 583 759  
Investimentos detidos até à maturidade -  -  
Ativos com acordo de recompra -  -  
Derivados para gestão de risco 222 769  318 596  
Ativos não correntes detidos para venda 7 764  3 182 479  
Ativos não correntes detidos para venda - operações descontinuadas 1 217 371  40 327  
Propriedades de investimento 1 206 355  54 625  
Outros ativos tangíveis 206 459  312 437  
Ativos intangíveis 44 663  221 168  
Investimentos em associadas 158 650  405 486  
Ativos por impostos correntes 30 620  38 848  
Ativos por impostos diferidos 2 603 979  2 523 154  
Provisões técnicas de resseguro cedido 6 355  7 696  
Outros ativos 3 460 416  1 910 126  
Devedores por seguro direto e resseguro 1 086  3 019  
Outros   3 459 330  1 907 107  
TOTAL DO ATIVO 52 332 672  57 517 090 
 
     
PASSIVO     
Recursos de bancos centrais 6 410 033  7 632 794  
Passivos financeiros detidos para negociação 632 831  743 860  
Outros passivos financeiros ao justo valor através de resultados -  -  
Recursos de outras instituições de crédito 3 577 914  4 157 132  
Recursos de clientes 25 989 719  27 582 142  
Responsabilidades representadas por títulos 3 817 801  4 224 658  
Passivos financeiros associados a ativos transferidos -  -  
Derivados para gestão de risco 108 265  77 846  
Contratos de Investimento 3 396 425  4 043 488  
Passivos não correntes detidos para venda 1 821  162 709  
Passivos não correntes detidos para venda - operações descontinuadas 748 807  92 893  
Provisões 364 615  465 114  
Provisões técnicas 1 333 567  1 344 216  
Passivos por impostos correntes 16 972  38 643  
Passivos por impostos diferidos 19 301  12 336  
Instrumentos representativos de capital -  -  
Outros passivos subordinados 48 100  56 260  
Outros passivos 718 548  947 625  
Credores por seguro direto e resseguro 10 945  17 301  
Outros   707 603  930 324  
TOTAL DO PASSIVO 47 184 719 
 
51 581 716 
 
     
CAPITAL     
Capital 4 900 000  4 900 000  
Prémios de emissão -  -  
Outros instrumentos de capital -  -  
Ações próprias -  -  
Reservas de reavaliação ( 289 082)  ( 249 748)  
Outras reservas e resultados transitados 1 244 028  2 158 080  
Resultado líquido do exercício atribuível aos acionistas do Banco ( 788 330)  ( 929 539)  
Dividendos antecipados -  -  
Interesses que não controlam   81 337  56 581  
TOTAL DO CAPITAL 5 147 953  5 935 374  
     
TOTAL DO PASSIVO + CAPITAL 52 332 672 
 
57 517 090 
 
     
* valores reexpress os     
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Appendix 16 – Grupo Novo Banco Income Statement on 




NOVO BANCO, S.A. 
DEMONSTRAÇÃO DE RESULTADOS CONSOLIDADOS EM 31 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2015 E DE 2016 
 
milhares de euros 
  
 
31.12.2016 31.12.2015 * 
Juros e proveitos similares 1 193 354 1 443 156 
 
Juros e custos similares   678 870    992 504 
Margem Financeira 514 484  450 652 
Rendimentos de instrumentos de capital 37 832  11 531 
Rendimentos de serviços e comissões 378 370 
 
471 499 
Encargos com serviços e comissões 113 003 
 
133 454 
Resultados de ativos e passivos avaliados ao justo valor através de resultados 22 905 
 
( 84 161) 
Resultados de ativos financeiros disponíveis para venda 116 429 
 
230 761 
Resultados de reavaliação cambial ( 6 576) 
 
30 092 
ados de alienação de outros ativos ( 51 736) 
 
( 12 341) 
Prémios líquidos de resseguro 49 201 
 
38 326 
s com sinistros líquidos de resseguro 167 744 
 
237 016 
ões das provisões técnicas líquidas de resseguro 105 345 
 
166 092 
Outros resultados de exploração 37 041 
 
( 103 701) 
Proveitos Operacionais 922 548  828 280 
Custos com pessoal 303 463 
 
397 564 
Gastos gerais administrativos 231 352 
 
285 384 
Depreciações e amortizações 56 061 
 
71 713 
Provisões líquidas e anulações 52 319 
 
( 54 512) 
dade do crédito líquida de reversões e recuperações 672 578 
 
739 323 
dade de outros ativos financeiros líquida de reversões e recuperações 365 883 
 
313 049 
dade de outros ativos líquida de reversões e recuperações 283 929 
 
60 072 
Custos Operacionais 1 965 585  1 812 593 
ção de subsidiárias e associadas 24 325 
 
33 
Diferenças de consolidação negativas - 
 
222 
ado de associadas e empreendimentos conjuntos (equivalência patrimonial) 4 074 
 
16 648 
Resultado antes de impostos ( 1 014 638)  ( 967 410) 
Impostos sobre o rendimento    
Correntes 16 330 
 
58 583 
Diferidos ( 243 924) 
 
( 78 674) 
 ( 227 594)  ( 20 091) 
tado de atividades em continuação ( 787 044)  ( 947 319) 
Resultado de operações descontinuadas ( 10 427) 
 
3 026 
Resultado líquido do exercício ( 797 471)  ( 944 293) 
 
 
Atribuível aos acionistas do Banco 
 
 
( 788 330) 
  
 
( 929 539) 
Atribuível aos Interesses que não controlam ( 9 141) 
 
( 14 754) 
 ( 797 471)  ( 944 293) 
    
    
    
* valores reexpressos    
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ATIVIDADE (milhões de euros) 
     
Ativos Totais(1) 105 917 104 912 98 589 97 765 93 342 
Ativo 81 702 83 028 80 237 83 691 80 608 
Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 50 531 52 606 51 211 50 399 49 722 
Depósitos de Clientes 25 447 30 819 34 206 34 540 36 831 
Recursos Totais de Clientes 60 595 55 988 54 383 56 188 56 838 
Core Capital - Banco de Portugal 5 232 5 416 6 020 6 471 6 084 
Core Capital - EBA - - - 6 092 5 646 
 
RESULTADOS/ RENDIBILIDADE 
     
Resultado do Exercício (M€) 571,7 556,9 -108,8 96,1 -517,6 
Rendibilidade dos Capitais Próprios (ROE) 11,0% 9,4% -0,1% 1,2% -6,9% 
Rendibilidade do Ativo (ROA) 0,73% 0,66% 0,00% 0,12% -0,62% 
 
SOLVABILIDADE - Rácios(2) 
     
- CORE TIER I - Banco de Portugal 8,0% 7,9% 9,2% 10,5% 10,6% 
- CORE TIER I - EBA - - - 9,9% 9,8% 
- TIER I 8,3% 8,8% 9,4% 10,4% 10,4% 
- Total 11,2% 11,3% 10,7% 11,3% 11,8% 
 
LIQUIDEZ (milhões de euros) 
     
Financiamento líquido do BCE(3) - 1 760 3 929 8 677 6 897 5 414 
Carteira Elegível para Colateral no BCE 5 553 10 823 15 057 19 402 18 578 
Rácio Crédito/ Depósitos(4) 192% 165% 141% 137% 121% 
QUALIDADE DOS ATIVOS 
     
Crédito Vencido >90 dias/ Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 1,60% 1,95% 2,74% 3,90% 5,68% 
Provisões para Crédito/ Crédito Vencido > 90 dias 191,5% 173,0% 154,5% 136,9% 119,9% 
Crédito em Risco(5)/ Crédito Total - 4,99% 6,59% 9,44% 10,56% 
Provisões para Crédito/ Crédito em Risco(5) - 67,8% 64,2% 56,6% 64,5% 
Provisões para Crédito/ Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 3,07% 3,38% 4,23% 5,34% 6,81% 
Custo do Risco(6) 1,07% 0,67% 1,17% 1,62% 2,02% 
PRODUTIVIDADE/ EFICIÊNCIA 
     
Custos Operativos/ Ativos Totais (%) 0,95% 1,07% 1,15% 1,18% 1,22% 
Ativos por Empregado (m€) 11 898 10 641 9 996 9 832 9 137 
Cost to Income (com mercados) (%) 41,1% 46,7% 57,9% 44,6% 59,8% 
Cost to Income (sem mercados) (%) 52,4% 57,0% 57,3% 57,2% 65,8% 
 
COLABORADORES (nº) 
     
Total (7) 8 902 9 858 9 863 9 944 10 216 
- Atividade Doméstica 7 388 7 584 7 588 7 477 7 371 
- Atividade Internacional 1 514 2 274 2 275 2 467 2 845 
 
REDE DE DISTRIBUIÇÃO (nº) 
     
Rede de Retalho 799 828 801 775 788 
- Doméstica 734 731 701 666 643 
- Internacional 65 97 100 109 145 
Centros de Empresa (Portugal) 26 24 24 25 25 
Centros Private Banking (Portugal) 25 22 22 23 23 
 
RATING 
     
Longo Prazo      
STANDARD AND POOR’S A A - BB BB- BB- 
MOODY’S A1 A2 Ba2 Ba3 Ba3 
DBRS - - BBB BBB(low) BBB(low) 
DAGONG - - - - BB 
Curto Prazo      
STANDARD AND POOR’S A 1 A 2 B B B 
MOODY’S P 1 P 1 NP NP NP 
DBRS - - R-2(high) R-2(med) R-2(med) 
DAGONG - - - - B 
 
(1) Ativo Líquido + Asset Management + Outra Desintermediação Passiva + Crédito Securitizado não consolidado. 
(2) Valores calculados com base no método IRB Foundation. 
(3) O valor positivo significa um recurso; o valor negativo significa uma aplicação. 
(4) Rácio calculado de acordo com a definição para efeitos do objetivo fixado pelo Banco de Portugal para este indicador no 
Funding & Capital Plan. 
 
(5) De acordo com a definição constante da Instrução nº23/2011 do Banco de Portugal. 
(6) Provisões para Crédito/ Crédito a Clientes (bruto). 
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 ATIVIDADE (milhões de euros)  
   
Ativo 72 383 65 417 57 529 
Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 41 663 40 060 37 417 
Depósitos de Clientes 24 617 26 626 27 364 
Capitais Próprios e Equiparados 6 100 5 410 5 947 
SOLVABILIDADE (1) 
   
Common EquityTier I /Ativos de Risco - 9,5% 13,5% 
Tier I /Ativos de Risco - 9,5% 13,5% 
Fundos Próprios Totais/Ativos de Risco - 9,5% 13,5% 
 LIQUIDEZ (milhões deeuros)  
   
Financiamento líquido junto do BCE (2) 8 768 7 812 7 040 
Carteira Elegível para Operações de Repos (BCE e outros) 15 892 14 171 12 740 
(Crédito Total - Provisões para Crédito)/ Depósitos de Clientes (1) 140% 126% 113% 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 14% 53% 77% 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 74% 83% 87% 
 QUALIDADE DOS ATIVOS 
   
Crédito Vencido >90 dias/Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 7,7% 8,7% 14,5% 
Crédito com Incumprimento / Crédito Total (1) 9,2% 9,9% 15,8% 
Crédito com Incumprimento, líquido / Crédito Total, líquido (1) -3,0% -3,4% 0,2% 
Crédito em Risco/Crédito Total (1) 13,5% 16,5% 22,8% 
Crédito em Risco, líquido / Crédito Total, líquido (1) 1,8% 4,2% 8,6% 
Provisões para Crédito/Crédito Vencido > 90 dias 153,7% 147,9% 107,8% 
Provisões para Crédito/Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 11,9% 12,8% 15,6% 
Custo do Risco - 2,27% 1,98% 
 RENDIBILIDADE  
   
Resultado do período (milhões de euros) - -497,6 -980,6 
Resultado antes de Impostos e Interesses que não controlam / Ativo Líquido médio (1) - -1,0% -1,6% 
Produto Bancário /Ativo Líquido médio (1) - 2,8% 1,4% 







   
Custos de Funcionamento + Amortizações / Produto Bancário (1) - 45,4% 85,8% 
Custos com Pessoal / Produto Bancário (1) - 22,7% 45,2% 
 COLABORADORES (nº)  
   
Total 7 887 7 722 7 311 
- Atividade Doméstica 6 950 6 832 6 571 
- Atividade Internacional 937 890 740 
 REDE DE BALCÕES (nº)  
   
Total 674 675 635 
- Doméstica 631 631 596 
- Internacional 43 44 39 
    
(a) Dados considerando o balanço de abertura após as deliberações de 22 de dezembro de 2014 e de 11 de fevereiro de 2015 
(b) Dados considerando a classificação do Banco Espírito Santo de Investimento como unidade emdescontinuação nostermos do IFRS5 
(1) De acordo com a Instrução nº 16/2004 do Banco de Portugal, na versão em vigor 
(2) Inclui financiamento e aplicações do/no SEBC; o valor positivo significa um recurso; o valor negativo significa uma aplicação 
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Appendix 19 – Grupo Novo Banco Main Indicators, on December 2016 
 
2. Principais Indicadores 
 
 
PRINCIPAIS INDICADORES 31-dez-15* 31-dez-16 
 
 
 ATIVIDADE (milhões de euros) 
  
Ativo 57 517 52 333 
Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 37 417 33 750 
Depósitos de Clientes 27 364 25 585 
Capitais Próprios e Equiparados 5 935 5 148 
SOLVABILIDADE (1) 
  
Common EquityTier I /Ativos de Risco 13,5% 12,0% 
Tier I /Ativos de Risco 13,5% 12,0% 
Fundos Próprios Totais/Ativos de Risco 13,5% 12,0% 
 LIQUIDEZ (milhões de euros)  
  
Financiamento líquido junto do BCE (2) 7 040 5 123 
Carteira Elegível para Operações de Repos (BCE e outros) 12 740 13 139 
(Crédito Total - Provisões para Crédito)/ Depósitos de Clientes (1) 113% 110% 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 77% 107% 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 87% 99% 
 QUALIDADE DOS ATIVOS 
  
Crédito Vencido >90 dias/Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 14,5% 17,0% 
Crédito com Incumprimento / Crédito Total (1) 15,8% 18,7% 
Crédito com Incumprimento, líquido / Crédito Total, líquido (1) 0,2% 2,6% 
Crédito em Risco/Crédito Total (1) 22,8% 25,6% 
Crédito em Risco, líquido / Crédito Total, líquido (1) 8,6% 10,9% 
Crédito Reestruturado(1) / Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 17,7% 23,7% 
Crédito Reestruturado não incluído no Crédito em Risco(1)/ Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 10,5% 11,9% 
Provisões para Crédito/Crédito Vencido > 90 dias 107,8% 97,2% 
Provisões para Crédito/Crédito a Clientes (bruto) 15,6% 16,5% 
Custo do Risco 1,98% 1,99% 
 RENDIBILIDADE 
  
Resultado do período (milhões de euros) -929,5 -788,3 
Resultado antes de Impostos e Interesses que não controlam / Ativo Líquido médio (1) -1,6% -1,9% 
Produto Bancário /Ativo Líquido médio (1) 1,4% 1,8% 




 EFICIÊNCIA  
Custos de Funcionamento + Amortizações / Produto Bancário (1) 85,8% 60,4% 
Custos com Pessoal / Produto Bancário (1) 45,2% 31,0% 
 
 COLABORADORES (nº)  
Total 7 311 6 096 
- Atividade Doméstica 6 571 5 687 
- Atividade Internacional 740 409 
 
 REDE DE BALCÕES (nº) 
  
Total 635 537 
- Doméstica 596 507 
- Internacional 39 30 
(1) De acordo com a Instrução nº 16/2004 do Banco de Portugal, na versão em vigor   
(2) Inclui financiamento e aplicações do/no SEBC; o valor positivo significa um recurso; o valor negativo significa uma aplic  ação 
* Valores reexpressos 
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Comunicado do Banco de Portugal sobre o processo de venda do Novo Banco 
 
O Banco de Portugal selecionou hoje a LONE STAR para concluir a operação de venda 
do Novo Banco tendo o Fundo de Resolução assinado os documentos contratuais da 
operação. A assinatura do contrato permite que seja cumprido o prazo de venda fixado 
nos compromissos assumidos pelo Estado junto da Comissão Europeia. Após a 
conclusão da operação, cessará a aplicação do regime das instituições de transição ao 
Novo Banco. 
Nos termos do acordo, a LONE STAR irá realizar injeções de capital no Novo Banco no 
montante total de 1.000 milhões de euros, dos quais 750 milhões de euros no momento 
da conclusão da operação e 250 milhões de euros no prazo de até 3 anos. 
Por via da injeção de capital a realizar, a LONE STAR passará a deter 75% do capital 
social do Novo Banco e o Fundo de Resolução manterá 25% do capital. 
As condições acordadas incluem ainda a existência de um mecanismo de capitalização 
contingente, nos termos do qual o Fundo de Resolução, enquanto acionista, se 
compromete a realizar injeções de capital no caso de se materializarem certas condições 
cumulativas, relacionadas com: i) o desempenho de um conjunto delimitado de ativos do 
Novo Banco e ii) com a evolução dos níveis de capitalização do banco. 
As eventuais injeções de capital a realizar nos termos deste mecanismo contingente 
beneficiam de uma almofada de capital resultante da injeção a realizar nos termos da 
operação e estão sujeitas a um limite máximoabsoluto. 
As condições acordadas preveem também mecanismos de salvaguarda dos interesses 
do Fundo de Resolução, de alinhamento de incentivos e de fiscalização, não obstante as 
limitações decorrentes da aplicação das regras de auxílios de Estado. 
A conclusão da operação de venda encontra-se dependente da obtenção das usuais 
autorizações regulatórias (incluindo por parte do Banco Central Europeu e da Comissão 
Europeia) e ainda da realização de um exercício de gestão de passivos, sujeito a adesão 
dos obrigacionistas, que irá abranger as obrigações não subordinadas do Novo Banco e 
que, através da oferta de novas obrigações, permita gerar pelo menos 500 milhões de 
euros de fundos próprios elegíveis para o cômputo do rácio CET1. 
A venda, uma vez concluída, permite um significativo reforço do capital do Novo Banco e 
a entrada de um acionista que assume um compromisso de médio e longo prazo com o 
banco, dotado dos meios necessários à execução de um plano que garanta, em 
Appendix 20 – Banco de Portugal Announcement, on 31st March 
2017 – “Novo Banco Selling Process” 
https://www.bportugal.pt/print/105416 15-10-2017  




definitivo, a plena recuperação em termos compatíveis com o papel determinante que o 
mesmo tem no financiamento da economia nacional. 
Este é mais um passo na estabilização do setor bancário nacional, para a qual é 
vantajosa a diversificação das fontes de financiamento permitida pela entrada de novos 
investidores. Este desenvolvimento permite também o reforço da credibilidade do setor 
bancário por via do desfecho bem-sucedido de um processo de venda aberto, 
transparente, concorrencial e de alcance internacional. 
 
 





Declaração do Governador Carlos da Silva Costa sobre o processo de venda do Novo Banco 
Appendix 21 – Crisis Timeline. BES Resolution 
 




1.- 11/7/2014 – O BES divulga a exposição ao universo GES e garante que tem 
almofada de capital suficiente para lidar com imprevistos. A KPMG detecta os  
primeiros indícios do esquema com recompra de dívida, que teve lugar até Abril. O 
Banco de Portugal veio a público descansar os depositantes do BES, seguido por Passos 
Coelho que afastou a necessidade de uma intervenção Estatal. 
2.- 14/7/2014 – Vítor Bento sucede a Ricardo Salgado na liderança do BES, cargo para 
o qual é cooptado. 
3.- 18/7/2014 – A KPMG informa Pedro Duarte Neves sobre a existência de riscos 
adicionais, relacionados com um novo esquema de financiamento do GES, detectado no 
BES. 
4.- 22/7/2014 – O ESFG abandona o PSI-20. A KPMG envia um email ao BdP a alertar 
para impactos sérios nos resultados do BES, sem quantificar. A CMVM também foi 
informada nessa altura. 
5.- 24/7/2014 – Ricardo Salgado é constituído arguido. A ESFG entrega um pedido de 
protecção contra credores. 
6.- 25/7/2014 – O BES adia os resultados semestrais para 30 de julho, devido aos 
problemas detectados pela KPMG. O BdP, numa compilação de esclarecimentos sobre  
o BES, informa que o banco estava sólido, com base nos dados de 11 de julho.  A 
KPMG entregou informação adicional sobre o impacto negativo do esquema de 
financiamento, que obrigaria a provisões no valor de 1,5 mil milhões de euros. A ESFG 
pediu gestão controlada. 
7.- 28/7/2014 – Em duas reuniões com Pedro Duarte Neves, a KPMG entrega os 
números finais das imparidades, 1,2 mil milhões. Segundo Carlos Costa, desde 
25/7/2014, o BdP estava a trabalhar em planos de contingência para lidar com o 
problema no BES. 
8.- 29/7/2014 – Na sequência de dois dias de reuniões com a gestão e os auditores do 
GES, o BdP envia a carta onde exige plano de reestruturação até dia 31/7/2014. 
9.- 30/7/2014 – O BES anuncia prejuízo record de 3,6 mil milhões, num comunicado 
divulgado às 21h19m, no site da CMVM. O BdP refere que a auditoria forense em curso 
permitirá apurar responsabilidades por parte da anterior administração do BES, liderado 
por Ricardo Salgado. Às 22h19m (hora de Bruxelas), a DGComp inicia uma 
“monitorização”, depois do BdP ter, durante a tarde, avisado a Comissão sobre os 
prejuízos record do BES. 
10.- 31/7/2014 – O Conselho de Ministros aprova uma alteração do Regime Geral das 
Instituições de Crédito e Sociedades Financeiras, viabilizando a resolução. 
11.- 1/8/2014 – A CMVM suspende as acções do BES até à divulgação de “informação 
relevante” – o plano de recapitalização (15h52m). A alteração do Regime Geral 
publicada em D.R., Governo e BdP optam pela resolução do BES. Segundo o BdP, a 
decisão foi tomada à hora de almoço, após uma conferência com o BCE. 
12.- 3/8/2014 – O governador do BdP anunciou a resolução na noite de domingo, dando 
origem à divisão do BES em banco “bom” (Novo Banco) e banco “mau” (o BES), que 
vai receber 4,9 mil milhões em dinheiros públicos, via fundo de resolução. O 
governador do Banco de Portugal garante que a resolução do BES “não terá qualquer 
custo para o erário público nem para os contribuintes”. 
Appendix 22 – BdP Governor Declarations on 17th November 2014 
 
(Diário Económico, 18 de Novembro de 2014) 
 
 
a) Sobre a medida de Resolução 
 
O governador do Banco de Portugal reafirmou ontem no Parlamento que a medida de 
resolução era a única opção válida que o supervisor tinha à disposição, a 31de julho,  
para resgatar o BES, devido à ameaça pelo BCE de suspender o estatuto de contraparte 
do BES. E adiantou que a alternativa da recapitalização pública com ‘Coco bonds’ –  
que foi aplicada em 2012 na CGD, no BCP, no BPI e no Banif – exigia mais tempo para 
ser preparada, mas também “uma decisão política” nesse sentido. Decisão esta que não 
existiu. Além disso o cenário de recapitalização também implicaria que os acionistas e 
obrigacionistas juniores também teriam de suportar perdas (‘burden sharing’). Em 
31/8/2014, a alternativa à resolução era a liquidação. 
b) Sobre a dívida do BES/Novo Banco, garantida pelo Estado. 
 
A dívida emitida pelo BES, com garantia do Estado, ascendia a 3,5 mil milhões de 
euros. Esta dívida garantida transitou para o Novo Banco, após a resolução decretado a 
3/8/2014. O governador do BdP declarou que “A garantia do Estado funciona como 
“back stop facility”. O facto de a dívida ser garantida pelo Estado teve por objectivo 
facilitar a obtenção de financiamento pelos bancos, que utilizam a dívida em questão 
como colateral no Banco Central Europeu (BCE). Numa situação limite o Estado 
poderia ser chamado a assumir o reembolso da dívida emitida pelos bancos. Segundo a 
proposta do Orçamento do Estado para 2015, o Novo Banco deverá devolver 3500 
milhões de euros de dívida garantida pelo Estado até final do próximo ano. Sobre isto, o 
governador declarou: A necessidade de o Novo Banco ter capacidade para pagar essa 
dívida na maturidade – ou precisar de pedir nova garantia – depende “basicamente do 
volume de crédito que o banco queira dar. E não podemos pedir ao banco que dê crédito 
e não obtenha liquidez, defendeu o governador.” 
c) O problema dos conglomerados mistos. 
 
O facto de a legislação europeia permitir que os bancos façam parte de conglomerados 
mistos, financeiros e não financeiros, que era o que acontecia com o BES, “favorece 
mecanismos de contágio difíceis de controlar”. O Banco de Portugal diz ser “ilusório” 
que o conjunto das partes relacionadas”, através do que está refletido no balanço dos 
bancos, é suficiente para um controlo eficaz. Até porque acrescenta, “os limites 
previstos na legislação não permitem contemplar as exposições fora do balanço, as 
quais, como aconteceu no caso BES, podem ser muito mais importantes”. 
d) As opacidades das “múltiplas jurisdições”. 
 
O facto de os conglomerados que integram bancos estarem, por vezes, localizados em 
várias jurisdições, algumas não cooperantes e opacas no acesso à informação relevante” 
é outro dos entraves identificados. O banco de Portugal defende ser necessário “analisar 
a forma de supervisionar as instituições com filiais localizadas em jurisdições com 
limitações de acesso a informação”. E questiona mesmo se será suficiente exigir a 
dedução ao capital dos valores referentes a essas filiais ou se se deverá “impedir que 
esse tipo de jurisdição faça parte do conglomerado”. 
e) Modelos de governo. 
 
O supervisor defende que há que garantir que ”os órgãos de fiscalização exercem as 
funções(...) de forma plena e eficaz” e propõe mesmo que este órgão deve “funcionar  
em permanência e não numa lógica de reuniões periódicas, trimestrais ou mensais”. 
Quanto aos responsáveis pelas áreas de ‘Compliance’, gestão de risco e auditoria 
interna, o governador defende que devem ter “autonomia e independência” e que “os 
supervisores têm de sujeitar as instituições que supervisionam a escrutínios periódicos 
das suas práticas de governação”. Aqui deverão estar as auditorias forenses que o Banco 
de Portugal está a começar a fazer aos bancos. 
e) Rapidez na atuação. 
 
O governador recorda que o supervisor tem de ter capacidade de “actuar decisivamente 
e com rapidez” mas que o actual quadro legal “impõe uma tal protecção a quem está na 
gestão das instituições financeiras que a possibilidade de o Banco de Portugal agir –  
sem correr o risco de infringir regras ou violar jurisprudência – é muito limitada”. De 
resto para Carlos Costa, as recentes alterações à legislação que rege a supervisão 
bancária, no que às questões de idoneidade diz respeito, ficaram “aquém da que o Banco 
de Portugal consideraria necessária” para retirar “alguns constrangimentos” a que o 
supervisor diz estar sujeito para atuar. E aponta também o dedo à jurisprudência dos 
tribunais que “tem vindo sucessivamente a reforçar as limitações com que o Banco de 
Portugal se confronta”. 
Appendix 23 – BES/Novo Banco Evolution of Capital and Asset Value (2008/2015) 
 
 
a) 21/12/2008: Capitalização Bolsista = 3345 milhões de euros. 
 
b) 2009: Aumento de capital no valor de 1200 milhões de euros 
 
c) 2010: Aumento de Capital no valor de 1000 milhões de euros 
 
d) 2012: Aumento de Capital no valor de 1009 milhões de euros 
 
e) 2014: Aumento de Capital no valor de 1045 milhões de euros 
 
f) Resolução 2014: Exclusão de Obrigações subordinadas (902 milhões de euros) 
 
g) Fundo de Resolução 2014: 4900 milhões de euros 
 
h) Resolução 2015: Obrigações seniores 1985 milhões de euros 
Appendix 24 – Sale Scenarios of Novo Banco, S.A. 
 
 




1.- A pressão de venda não foi boa para o negócio. 
 
2.- A venda manteve contingências quanto às reais necessidades de capital da 
instituição, o que desvalorizou o activo. 
3. – Rigidez na gestão interna de ativos condicionou a reestruturação do Novo Banco. 
 
4. Os dois finalistas da 1ª fase de venda, a Anbang e a Fosun, foram também 
prejudicados pela crise que se instalou nos mercados financeiros asiáticos, em particular 
da bolsa de Xangai desde Julho de 2015. Tendo dificuldade de mobilizar recursos e 
garantias para a operação. 
b) 2º cenário de venda – 15 de Janº 2016/15 de Julho 2016 
 
Transferência do Novo Banco para o BES de 1985 mil milhões de euros de obrigações 
senior, fechando-se o perímetro do balanço, com vistas a nova fase de venda. 
1. Em Março de 2016, o Banco de Portugal anuncia as novas regras de venda do Novo 
Banco. 
2. Em 30 de Junho o Banco de Portugal anuncia ter recebido quatro propostas. 
 
3. Em 12 de Julho Eduardo Stock da Cunha deixa o Novo Banco, sendo substituído por 
António Ramalho. 
c) 3º cenário de venda – 15 de Janº 2017/15 de Julho 2017 
 
1. Em 4 de Janeiro de 2017 o Banco de Portugal anuncia que o Fundo Lone Star é a 
instituição melhor colocada. 
2. A 31 de Março de 2017 o primeiro-ministro António Costa anuncia a venda do Novo 
Banco à Lone Star, como a melhor solução “sem custos diretos e indiretos para o 
contribuinte”. 
